Evolutionary systems theory
Article with the subtitle: “A unifying meta-theory of psychological science,” Review of General Psychology 16(1):10-23 . Given there seems to be a conflict between evolutionary psychology and dynamic systems theory this article is relevant. The abstract:
“Psychology is a theoretically heterogeneous discipline seeking a single, cohesive framework to unite the subdisciplines. To address this issue, I propose a hierarchical metatheory of psychological science that synthesizes neo-Darwinian selectionist thinking and dynamic systems theory by organizing evolutionary psychology, evolutionary developmental biology, developmental psychobiology, and the subdisciplines of psychology around four specific, interrelated levels of analysis: functional explanations for evolved, species-typical characteristics; explanations for between-groups differences arising from phylogenetic mechanisms; explanations for individual differences resulting from ontogenetic processes; and mechanistic explanations for real-time phenomena, respectively. Informational exchange between these levels advances their integration and facilitates important innovations, and the nonsubstantive metatheories of general selection and self-organization interpenetrate all four levels to promote consilience. I conclude by discussing the implications of this model for theory and research.”
Discussing the massive modularity hypothesis (MMH) of evolutionary psychology (EP), the authors note that it rejects the distinction between central and peripheral systems. In response they state: “Accordingly, I propose that evolutionary psychologists avoid potentially misleading notions of domain-specificity/generality by adopting the hypothesis of a hierarchically mechanistic mind (HMM), entailing a structured hierarchy of interacting adaptive, psychobiological mechanisms. The base of this hierarchy comprises highly encapsulated, more innate exclusive processes that are relatively isolated from other mechanisms and exhibit particularly constrained, automatic (so-called) ‘modular’ algorithmic properties (e.g., sensory processes); while more inclusive mechanisms perform more flexible, executive functions by processing… Read more »